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Abstract:  In an extension of an earlier paper (Hart and Roberts, 2012), we investigate 
the pay and working time of blue-collar timeworkers and pieceworkers during the Great 
Depression within British engineering firms.  We compare and contrast 
southern/midland engineering districts of Britain with northern districts.  The 
south/midlands region was dominated by piece-rated workers and by modern sections 
of the industry, such as vehicle and aircraft manufacture.  Time-rated work 
predominated in northern districts where older sections – for example, marine and 
textile engineering – were clustered.  These contrasting industrial compositions and 
associated payment methods offer further insights into manufacturing real earnings 
responses to the Great Depression. 
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  “Engineering, while concerned chiefly with metal manufacture, is an industrial colossus: 
its products range from gasometers to jet engines, cathode ray tubes to combine 
harvesters, and telephones to tanks” (Knowles and Hill, 1954, p. 308) 
 
1 Introduction 
In an earlier paper (Hart and Roberts, 2012) we presented evidence on the real 
wage cyclicality of blue collar workers during the Great Depression in Britain’s most 
important manufacturing industrial sector, engineering and metal working.  Using 
payroll data of member firms of the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) between 
1927 and 1937, we establish that the hourly real wages of time-rated workers were 
acyclical while those of piece-rated workers were significantly, though modestly, 
procyclical.   Both pay groups displayed significant and strong procyclicality in weekly 
real earnings.   
We extend our earlier study by exploring the implications for wage and hours 
cyclicality of the considerable differences in the composition of engineering production 
in southern and midland geographical engineering districts of Britain compared with 
northern districts.  For the large part the most modern and expanding sections of the 
industry were located in the south and midlands.  These included motor vehicles, 
aircraft manufacture, machine tools and electrical engineering.  Throughout the 
Depression, these districts enjoyed the highest EEF earnings and experienced the lowest 
district unemployment rates (Hart and MacKay, 1975, Table 5). In contrast, older 
declining sections of the industry were largely confined to northern districts.  These 
included marine engineering, textile machinery and agricultural machinery.  Moreover, 
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in both north and south, specific engineering sections tended to cluster within specific 
districts.  Coventry and the West Midlands were most associated with motor vehicle 
production, North West Scotland and the North East Coast of England with marine 
engineering, and various districts in Lancashire and Yorkshire with textile machinery. 
This north-south divide in production orientation was reinforced by differences 
in the payment methods in respect of the two regional workforces.  In our complete 
national EEF data, 53% of workers were paid piece rates and 47% time rates.1   The 
incidence of piece rate payments was at least as important as that of time rates in the 
EEF throughout the first half of the Twentieth Century. In a broader context, piece rates 
applied to about two-thirds of skilled and semi-skilled workers in engineering and metal 
working in both Britain and Germany in the early 1930s (Hart and Roberts, 2012).  The 
literature on the subsequent long-term demise of piece rate systems, given major 
changes in manufacturing techniques and organisation, includes Helper, Kleiner and 
Wang (2010), and Arrowsmith and Marginson (2010) for Britain. 2   
The incidence of timeworking was more important among the northern 
workforce and pieceworking more important in the south and midlands. This is shown in 
Figure 1.  In 1927, pieceworkers comprised 53% of total workers in the 
                                                          
1 These percentages cover all EEF districts.  In the analysis here, we concentrate on the 
sub-set of districts for which we have matching unemployment rates.  
 
2 For example, the advent of just-in-time systems in modern manufacturing was 
intended in part to minimise inventories. Parts suppliers are required to meet specified 
output quantities within given time frames.  There is no incentive to exceed production 
quotas by encouraging higher output levels through payments by results schemes. 
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southern/midland districts compared to 37% in northern districts.  By 1937, the 
respective percentages had risen to 68% and 58%.3  The overall rises in the pieceworker 
shares were not monotonic. In both regions they dipped slightly in 1930 followed by 
strong increases in 1931 and 1932.   
Here, we investigate the implications for pay cyclicality of these geographical 
differences in industrial composition and in payment methods.  We find that the real 
weekly real earnings for both pay groups in both regions were strongly procyclical.  But 
the cyclicality for the main components of weekly pay was not uniform.  Hourly real 
earnings of timeworkers, both north and south, were more or less acyclical.   
Timeworkers’ payroll costs were reduced principally through strongly procyclical 
changes in weekly paid-for hours. The weekly paid-for hours of pieceworkers were also 
procyclical, but less strongly so than those timeworkers.  Unlike timeworkers, the real 
hourly pay of pieceworkers was procyclical and significantly more so in 
southern/midland engineering districts.  We argue that this resulted, primarily, from the 
fact that piecework remuneration in core growth sections like vehicle production was 
strongly conditioned by productive effort per unit of time. 
 
2 Engineering industrial and workforce compositions in the 1930s 
By the mid-1930s, British engineering had experienced two large industry-wide 
changes. The first was both longer term and structural.  The previous thirty years had 
                                                          
3 The data include labourers for whom piece rates were less common than for skilled 
and semi skilled blue collar workers.   
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witnessed marked expansions in new sections of the industry.  The main growth 
occurred in vehicle production, aircraft manufacture, electrical engineering, and 
machine tools.  These sections were principally located in southern and midlands 
engineering districts.  Older, more traditional sections –including marine engineering, 
textile engineering, and agricultural machinery – were in secular decline and were 
largely confined to northern districts.4  The second change was cyclical, sudden, and 
relatively short-lived. The Great Depression witnessed a severe drop in output demand 
and in product prices that started in late 1929 and continued to 1934.  Given their 
favourable sectional compositions, southern/midland engineering districts were better 
shielded against the most severe cutbacks in production and employment.  
The better fortunes of the south were reflected on companies’ intensive and 
extensive margins.  On intensive margins, weekly hours of work in the EEF were 
everywhere procyclical.  However, Figure 2 shows that in the first stages of the 
Depression cycle short time working among both timeworkers’ and pieceworkers’ – i.e. 
weekly hours less than the maximum 47 hours – was a considerably greater 
phenomenon in the north.  On extensive margins, there was a greater propensity to 
layoff workers in northern engineering districts.  Figure 3 shows that unemployment 
rates in northern districts were substantially higher than in southern/midland districts.  
By 1932, the unemployment rate in the former was 32% compared with 18% in the 
latter.     
                                                          
4 EEF engineering districts belonging to these two broad regions are reported in Table 1 
together with the blue collar occupations included in the present study.  
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Based on timeworkers, Table 2 illustrates pay and hours implications of the 
compositional diversity across EEF districts and sections. In the midlands, Coventry was 
the epicentre of modern engineering activity, playing a central role in motor and cycle 
manufacture, airframe manufacture, and machine tools.  In the north, the North East 
Coast and Halifax were districts in which older engineering activity took place.  The 
former included marine engineering and the latter textile machine manufacture and 
repair. Accordingly, Table 2 also includes three representative engineering sections for 
the three districts: vehicles and cycles, marine engineering, and textile machinery.5  
Differences in labour and production performances are illustrated by recovery 
rates in real standard hourly wages and in hours of work in the post-Depression years of 
1934-1937 compared to the Depression years, 1930-1933.  Coventry’s average real 
wage growth was 11.6% in contrast to 7.1% in the North East Coast, and 4.6% in Halifax. 
Since Coventry was less affected by the Depression than the other two districts (see 
Hart and MacKay, 1975, Table 5), we find that it experienced a mere 3% rise in weekly 
hours between the two periods in contrast to 8.7% and 16% increases in the North East 
Coast and Halifax, respectively. 6  The relative wages and hours changes in respect of the 
associated sections reveal a comparable picture: the vehicle section displayed far more 
resilience than the two more traditional engineering sections. 
                                                          
5 Note, however, that the sections refer to all relevant engineering districts nationwide.  
We do not have EEF section data by district. 
 
6 Coventry’s unemployment rate during the Great Depression peaked in 1931 at 18.1%; 
Halifax’s rate peaked at 24.6% in the same year while the North East Coast peaked at 
43.1% in 1932.  
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Why was there a greater incidence of pieceworking in the south/midlands and of 
timeworking in the north (see Figure 1)?  Almost certainly, this is closely linked to 
distinct clusters of sectional engineering activities within districts in these two broad 
geographical areas.  For example, many EEF companies in the south and midlands were 
involved in vehicle production.7  The expanding demand for vehicles and vehicle parts 
necessitated long production runs that required large-scale supplies based on the same 
designs.  This type of small-parts production orientation was conducive to payments-by-
results remuneration via piece rate pricing on products that were amenable to 
monitoring for quality and quantity (see Helper, Kleiner and Wang, 2010).8  By contrast, 
the production of marine engines in the north of Britain entailed more specialised parts 
manufacture and assembly.  Engineering job tasks on more complex heavy engineering 
products almost certainly involved higher degrees of multi-tasking among the blue-
collar workforce as well as outputs that were costly to quantify and, therefore, more 
likely to be conducive to a fixed-wage system (see Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991).   
Table 3 shows the percentages of pieceworkers to all blue-collar workers by the 
engineering sections covered in our EEF data sample.  Four of the top-five ranked 
sections relate to vehicles and aircraft manufacture and these were all predominantly 
located in midlands and southern districts.  It should be added that pieceworking is 
strongly represented in all sections – apart from lamp manufacture.  So while sections 
                                                          
7 The EEF was strongly represented in all major British car companies and in their main 
parts suppliers. 
 
8 Long production runs were an especially important consideration since they reduced 
the frequency, and associated costs, of negotiating piece rates.  
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like textile machinery and marine engineering were heavily concentrated in the north, 
pieceworkers nonetheless accounted for roughly half of their workforces.  
 
3 The structures of timework and piecework earnings in the EEF 
In this section we show the main component parts of timeworkers’ and 
pieceworkers’ weekly earnings, highlighting potential interactions with business cycle 
fluctuations.  In addition to the earnings elements incorporated here, remuneration 
incorporated a National Bonus payment.9   There was also a wide variety of 
supplementary payments.10  Examples include ‘dirty money’ (wage supplements to 
compensate for adverse working conditions), merit awards, and compensatory 
bonuses.11  
                                                          
9 The National Bonus was first paid in 1917 in order to compensate engineering workers 
for exceptional cost of living increases during WWI.  While it was intended to be a 
temporary pay supplement and while it was significantly reduced in 1922, it was not 
consolidated into basic rates of pay until 1950.  In 1927, timeworkers, but not 
pieceworkers, received a 20% Bonus increase.  Further money increases in 1935, 1936 
and 1937 applied equally to both timeworkers and pieceworkers.  All four changes 
served to reduce piecework-timework minimum expected pay differentials. While we 
refer to the Bonus in this section, in order to avoid undue detail, we do not explicitly 
highlight it in our definitions of timework and piecework earnings.  Detailed analyses of 
the inter-war and immediate post-war EEF earnings structure, including the contribution 
of the National Bonus, are given by Knowles and Robertson (1951) and Knowles and Hill 
(1954). 
 
10 We make no attempt to incorporate the roles played by supplementary payments. 
They became more important prior to WWII, through the war, and in the immediate 
post-war years.  See Knowles and Hill (1954, Table IX). 
 
11 Compensatory bonuses were paid to timeworkers whose work was deemed to add 
value above average but who, unlike pieceworkers, were not eligible to receive 
payments directly related to performance. 
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Average timeworkers’ weekly earnings for occupation j in engineering district d 
at time t is given by 
( )                 
where E is average weekly earnings, e is average hourly earnings, and H is average 
weekly paid-for hours.   
Overtime working was an important feature of weekly working time and given 
that hourly overtime pay differed from standard time pay we need to distinguish 
between the two types of hours.  Let H = HS + HO where HS is standard weekly hours paid 
for at basic rates and HO is overtime weekly hours to which a premium rates applied. 
Maximum EEF weekly standard hours were 47 and so HO > 0 if H > 47.  Let   = HS/H in 
which case   < 1 if HS < (HS + HO) and   = 1 if HS = H.  Then (1 -  ) defines the share of 
overtime in weekly hours. Incorporating this share, it is useful to approximate hourly 
earnings using a geometric average.  We have 
 
( )          
    (      )
(      )     
 
where w is the basic hourly time rate12 and k is the overtime premium.  Local-level basic 
time rates were generally related to nationally-negotiated time rates for skilled fitters 
and unskilled labourers.  However, company- and district-level interpretations of 
occupational wage relativities could vary widely. More national uniformity was achieved 
in respect of maximum weekly standard hours and the overtime premium.  Both 
                                                          
12 The basic time rate was supplemented by the National Bonus to create a so-called 
actual or effective rate.  Here, we ignore the Bonus add-on.  
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maximum HS and k were set nationally and applied to all workers in the EEF (i.e. 
timeworkers and pieceworkers). Maximum Hs remained fixed at 47 hours throughout 
our period while k was altered once, in 1931.   
Substituting (2) into (1), taking logs and differentiating with respect to national 
unemployment (Ut) to represent the cycle
13, gives 
 
( )  
       
   
 
      
   
 (    )
 (      )
   
 (      )
     
   
 
       
   
   
 
Pieceworkers’ weekly earnings involved more complicated considerations. They 
depended on a multitude of piecework prices applied to a considerable diversity of 
products, processes and operations. As well as the number of hours per week, they 
were also dependent on productive effort per hour. Overtime pay applied along the 
same lines as timeworkers.  In principle, much of the complexity derived from the fact 
that piece rates and time settings were established at local levels.  In practice, starting in 
1914, attempts were made to simplify hourly piecework pay by linking it to equivalent 
time rates via national employer-union agreements.  First, a pieceworker was 
guaranteed the basic equivalent time rate.   Secondly, a pieceworker of ‘average ability’ 
in a given occupation was expected to receive a minimum hourly basic wage rate that 
was at least 33⅓ per cent over the equivalent basic time rate.  This was referred to as 
                                                          
13 In the earnings estimation in Section 5 we use both national and district-level 
unemployment rates. 
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the piecework percentage, which we label p-p.  From June 1931 to March 1943, the p-p 
was reduced to 25 per cent of the basic time rate. 14   
   The p-p had the advantage of providing a target, recognised throughout the 
industry, by which the basic hourly wages of typical pieceworkers might be expected to 
exceed the equivalent timeworker rates. It also helped to set piecework prices: these 
were adjusted so that the piece rate percentages were achieved.  Piece rate prices and 
times were set at local levels.  For given pieceworker occupations, deviations from 
nationally agreed time rates and from the p-p could well occur. However, even allowing 
for local pay variations, the system had a major limitation.  Changes nationally agreed 
basic time rates or in the p-p implied considerable costs of adjusting a vast number of 
linked piecework prices.15   
There remains a fundamentally important aspect of piecework remuneration. 
Unlike timeworkers, hourly pay of pieceworkers is dependent on their output per hour.   
Suppose that, under given business expectations, piece-rates were set such that a 
pieceworker may expect to earn x% per hour more than an equivalent time worker. An 
unanticipated fall in output demand involves two potential intensive margin cost-cutting 
                                                          
14 It is important to note that the p-p did not imply that, as a minimum, a typical 
pieceworker could expect to earn one-third or one-quarter more than an equivalent 
timeworker.  A pieceworker’s effective minimum rate of pay consisted of the basic time 
rate plus the p-p plus the National Bonus.  A timeworker’s effective minimum rate of 
pay consisted of the basic time rate plus the National Bonus.  The National Bonus 
payment ensured that the effective minimum rates’ differential was less than the p-p. 
   
 
15 See Knowles and Hill (1954, especially p. 284 and p. 302).  In fact, it was argued that 
piecework pay differentials were best adjusted via changes in the National Bonus since 
this side-stepped the problems of piece rate price adjustments. 
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reactions by employers.  First, weekly hours could be reduced.  Second, output per 
person-hour could be reduced by slowing the rate of production throughput. Only the 
first of these two cost objectives was feasible, at least in the short-run, in the case of 
timeworkers.    
As shown in Table 3, vehicle production was dominated by piecework.  It offers 
an obvious example of a section in which hourly productivity might fluctuate since the 
batch production of car and truck parts among suppliers was in important respects 
controlled by changes in the per-period rates of vehicle assembly.  A persuasive example 
is given by Knowles and Hill (1954, pp. 310/311) in respect of car production in EEF 
companies between 1948 and 1953. “Motor car production reached a peak in the export 
boom of 1950, fell off in 1951-52 when the export market collapsed and steel supplies 
were short, and rose very steeply in 1952-53 when the steel shortage had eased.  
Pieceworkers’ average hourly earnings in motor cars were responsive to this fluctuation: 
they increased much more than the average between 1948 and 1951….., in 1951-52 their 
rise was below average; while in 1952-53 it was again easily the largest of any section.”  
These authors further report that, over this period, employment was static and 
“fluctuations in hours worked in this section were not nearly sufficient to offset the 
fluctuations in production”.  They conclude that hourly earnings fluctuations derived 
principally from variations in hourly productivity.  
Pooling together these various piecework pay components, and recognizing that 
we are offering no more than an approximation to actual piece rate setting in many 
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local districts, average pieceworkers weekly pay for occupation j in district d at time t is 
given by 
( )       ((    )
    )               
where P is average weekly earnings, p is average hourly earnings.   The parameter,  , 
represents hourly productive work intensity. For simplicity we assume that   = 1 
represents optimal intensity of effort – such as the agreed line speed in a car assembly 
plant in the face of a healthy order book - while   <1 represents short-run periods in 
which productive effort falls short of this optimum due to unanticipated demand 
reductions. For any given value of  , work intensity is assumed constant across all 
weekly hours.16  
Average hourly piecework earnings are given by  
( )      (       )
   (        )
(     )     
where m is a percentage piece rate markup.   The markup is made up of two parts, that 
is  
( )      (   )            
where δ is the district deviation from the national piecework percentage, p-p. 
Substituting (5) into (4) taking logs and differentiating with respect to national 
unemployment (Ut), gives 
                                                          
16 We ignore individuals’ supply-side reactions to company-led required changes in 
effort due to product demand fluctuations.   
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( )  
       
   
     [
       
   
 
       
   
 (    )
 (      )
   
 (      )
     
   
]        
 
     
   
(      )  
       
   
   
                                    
During periods when   = 1, and so 
     
   
     pieceworkers’ (potential) cyclical 
responses are confined to changes in wage earnings and weekly hours.   Where there is 
no such binding constraint then 
     
   
   or productive work intensity is procyclical. 
For timeworkers and pieceworkers in (3) and (7), changes in basic time rates, the 
overtime premium, the share of overtime, and total weekly hours had potential cyclical 
impacts on weekly earnings.  Additionally, the cyclicality of pieceworkers’ earnings could 
be affected by changes in piecework percentage and in hourly productivity.  
 
4 EEF Data 
We make use of EEF member firms’ payroll data for the period 1927-1937.  
Detailed data descriptions are provided by Hart and Roberts (2012).  During our period 
of study, the Federation represented between 1,800 and 2,200 firms employing 
between 390,000 and 520,000 adult male manual workers (Wigham, 1973, Appendix, J).  
Our wages and hours data cover manual male timeworkers and pieceworkers over the 
age of 21 in 14 blue-collar occupations.  The payroll data are collected in October of 
each year.  The wages data cover hourly basic wage rates, hourly earnings, weekly 
hours, and weekly earnings.  For any given wage or hours definition, we construct cell 
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means where each cell identifies whether the worker is paid time rates or piece rates, 
his occupation, and his work district.   
In the complete EEF dataset (see Acknowledgements) there are 51 engineering 
districts.  Here, we make use of a sub-set of 28 districts for which we have matching 
annual unemployment rates: together, they account for 85% of the total sample EEF 
labour force in the full data set.  Table 1 shows the 14 occupations and the division of 
the 28 districts as between the north and south/midlands.   
5 Piecework-timework hourly earnings differentials 
Pieceworkers’ rates of pay in the EEF were higher than those of equivalent 
timeworkers, a finding common to the literature (e.g., Pencavel, 1977; Seiler, 1984). For 
example, more able individuals opt into piece-rated jobs since they know that they can 
earn more per unit of time than in equivalent time-rated jobs.  What happened to the 
piecework-timework hourly earnings differentials over the Great Depression cycle?   
Using our complete data, we estimate the path of the piecework-timework 
hourly earnings differential after conditioning for occupations, districts, and time.  The 
differential is given by 
 
( )                           
 
where Z represents a set of controls consisting of occupation dummies, district 
dummies, and year dummies.  We estimate equation (8) in two ways: we show hourly 
earnings that (a) include the effects of overtime, and (b) exclude the effects of 
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overtime.17  The estimated annual differentials for the two earnings series are shown in 
Figure 4 – they are the plots of the estimated year dummies in equation (8).  The piece-
time hourly earnings differentials narrowed appreciably between 1929 and 1932 when 
the most severe downturn of the Depression occurred.  The outcomes are virtually 
identical whether or not we adjust for the effects of overtime.   
Does the pattern in Figure 4 hold when we split the data into northern and 
southern/midland districts?  The answer is yes, and this is illustrated in Figure 5 in 
respect of turners using their overtime-corrected hourly earnings. This is a major 
engineering occupation with a large representation in the two sets of districts. The 
differentials coincide closely, falling from about 21/22% in 1930 to a trough of under 
13/15% by 1932/33 before climbing to about 17% by 1937. This pattern is common 
across occupations. 
In Section 3, we noted two national level agreements reached in 1931 that 
served to narrow the differentials.  First, the piecework percentage was reduced from 
one-third to one-quarter above the equivalent basic time rate.  Second, the overtime 
premium in respect of the first two hours of daily overtime was reduced from time and a 
                                                          
17 From Figure 2 we know that the length of timeworkers’ weekly hours exceeded those 
of pieceworkers.  Without correcting for overtime, hourly earnings differentials can, 
therefore, partially reflect different shares of overtime hours within total hours. We 
adjust for overtime by multiplying hours above 47 weekly hours by the appropriate 
overtime premium rates.  These corrected hours are then divided into total weekly 
earnings to obtain standard-equivalent earnings differentials.  Actually, this only 
provides approximate estimates since overtime pay in the EEF was paid in respect of 
daily hours worked and so was conditioned in part by the distribution of daily hours.  
We adopt the approximation in our calculations due to the absence of data on daily 
hours.   
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half to time and a quarter.  We note, however, that while the earnings differentials 
declined in 1931 – to some extent influenced by these policy changes – they had 
declined even more steeply in the preceding two years.  Also, post-1932 the differentials 
rose despite the fact that, as noted in footnote 9, the National Bonus increases from 
1935 to 1937 acted in favour of timeorkers’ earnings. 
  
6 Real earnings cyclicality and the north-south divide 
Wages and hours regressions are undertaken separately for pieceworkers and 
timeworkers.  Following the discussions in Sections 2 and 4, we want to test for 
differences in pay and hours responses to the Great Depression business cycle between 
northern engineering districts and southern/midland districts.  Accordingly, we define a 
binary variable D such that 
( )                                          
                            
Our pay and hours estimating equations incorporate Dt to allow for differences in 
the pay reactions of northern and southern/midland hourly earnings to the Great 
Depression business cycle.  We use both national and district-level unemployment rates 
to proxy the cycle.  We illustrate our regression equations on the basis of hourly 
earnings, expressed e = E/H and p = P/H (see Section 3).    
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  Let Δe be annual first-differenced hourly real earnings of timeworkers and Δp 
be the equivalent for pieceworkers.  For occupation j in district d at time t, our 
regressions based on national unemployment are given by 
(  )                                             
(  )                                           
where ΔUt is the first-differenced national unemployment rate,       is a slope dummy, 
and Zjdt is a set of controls consisting of occupation dummies, district dummies, and a 
time trend. Given we have annual occupational hourly earnings that are regressed on a 
single national rate of unemployment, potential standard error biases are countered by 
clustering at the year level.  Real hourly earnings are obtained using a final output price 
deflator obtained from Feinstein (1972).   Reported estimates are weighted by the 
numbers of workers in each annual occupational earnings cell. 
Our regressions incorporating district-level unemployment rates are given by 
(  )                                                
(  )                                              
where unemployment rates are now further delineated by districts, and Zjdt contains 
occupation, district, and year dummies.  Given we have up to 14 occupational earnings 
rates per district we counter potential standard error biases by clustering at the 
district/year level.  Real hourly earnings derive from controlling for both districts and 
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year fixed effects.  Reported estimates are weighted by the numbers of workers in each 
occupation cell at district level. 
Additionally, we recognise that the error terms between the foregoing pairs of 
pieceworker and timeworker regressions are likely to be contemporaneously correlated. 
In Section 3 we report on national initiatives to adopt fitters’ and labourers’ agreed 
national basic hourly wages as the comparative basis for setting the minimum expected 
rates of hourly pay of pieceworkers of average ability, the piecework percentage.    
Accordingly, we obtain robust standard errors for the timeworker/ pieceworker 
equations using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation.18   
As in expressions (1) and (4), we present our results for the two pay groups in 
terms of weekly real earnings and their two component parts, weekly hours and hourly 
real earnings. We concentrate on wage/hours–unemployment semi-elasticities. 19 
The weekly earnings results in Table 5 present a relatively simple picture.20 
Weekly real earnings of both timeworkers and pieceworkers are highly procyclical. 
Results based on the national rate of unemployment do not differ significantly from 
those based on district rates.  A one point increase in the rate of unemployment is 
associated with decreases of between 0.6% and 1% in weekly real earnings.  The results 
                                                          
18 We obtain simultaneous equation estimates with robust standard errors using 
STATA’s suest postestimation command.   
 
19 In our related work (Hart and Roberts, 2012), we investigate the issue of possible 
biases due to within-occupation heterogeneity.  We argue that this is likely to be small. 
 
20 We do not show results with respect to the shift dummy, Dt.  Throughout, It is 
generally insignificant with no bearing on our key findings. 
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with respect to district unemployment rates suggest – albeit with large standard errors – 
that northern weekly earnings procyclicality was stronger than for southern/midland 
districts. 
As shown in Figure 2, weekly hours of work were procyclical in both northern 
and southern/midland districts.  Therefore, we would expect that hours’ fluctuations 
would importantly contribute to weekly earnings procyclicality.  In the case of 
timeworkers, Table 6 reveals that this is unequivocally true. There is one caveat.  While 
the timeworker results based on national unemployment imply no distinction between 
the north and the south/midlands, those based on district unemployment rates suggest 
that timeworkers’ hours in northern districts were more procyclical than further south.  
Weekly hours of pieceworkers display cyclicality on a par with timeworkers.  But this is 
not due to a uniform reaction across districts.   Especially using district unemployment 
rates, hours fluctuations among northern pieceworkers are significantly more procyclical 
than among their south/midlands counterparts. 
The microeconometric literature on real earnings cyclicality has been most 
concerned with hourly, not weekly, real earnings.  Our EEF outcomes in this dimension 
are shown in Table 7.   
In respect of timeworkers, they underscore the earlier findings of Hart and 
Roberts (2012), viz. the hourly real pay of engineering timeworkers was more or less 
everwhere acyclical during the Great Depression.  This is firmly the case in respect of 
standard hourly rates of pay.  When we incorporate overtime working there is some 
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indication that real hourly earnings were very weakly procyclical.  But pieceworkers 
made up more than half the workforce in the EEF and here the hourly earnings 
outcomes tell a different story.  First, at national district level, pieceworkers’ real hourly 
earnings are significantly procyclical.  A one point increase in the rate of unemployment 
is associated with decrease of abut one-third of 1% in hourly real earnings.  This semi-
elasticity is lower than found in more contemporary studies where a point rise in 
unemployment is typically found to be associated with, at least, a 1% fall in hourly real 
earnings (Pissarides, 2009).  However, the results with respect to the north-south split 
show that northern districts serve to lower the overall hourly earnings response.  Based 
on district unemployment rates, the semi-elasticity is found to be significantly smaller in 
northern compared to southern/midland districts.  Including the northern slope dummy 
alters the estimated wage-unemployment semi-elasticity from -0.34 to -0.53.  While this 
is roughly half the size of modern studies it nevertheless tells us that the hourly real 
earnings of nearly two-thirds of the blue collar engineering workforce in the regions of 
Britain with the most modern industries experienced quite strong real earnings 
procyclicality in the Great Depression.   
7 Discussion 
In equation (3), we identify four main components of timeworkers’ weekly real 
earnings that were susceptible to business cycle influences – basic hourly real wages, 
the share of overtime hours within total hours, the overtime premium, and total weekly 
hours of work.  We find that the first three of these variables displayed little or no 
cyclical variability.  Hourly basic real wages, strongly conditioned by national 
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agreements, were acyclical while hourly real earnings, that include the effects of 
overtime, were very weakly procyclical.  Only weekly hours responded strongly, and 
procyclically, to the national and district unemployment changes.   
Why were timeworkers’ hourly real earnings unresponsive to the business cycle 
fluctuations?  Product and consumer prices both fell by 13.5% and 12.1% between 1928 
and 1934 (Hart and Roberts, 2012).  Minimum basic money time rates were set by 
national agreement for fitters and labourers and these rates were generally adopted as 
a basis for setting minimum time rates across occupations.  For the whole of our period, 
the nationally agreed minimum rates were held constant (see Knowles and Hill, 1954, 
Table 3).  So, while basic money rates above the agreed floors were undoubtedly 
reduced in response to the 1929 downturn, cuts were generally constrained by the 
minimum rates.  The net effect was that basic real time rates were acyclical.  Since, at 
the start of the Depression, cuts in timeworkers’ weekly hours reduced the share of 
overtime, falls in hourly earnings could be achieved via this route.  However, as is clear 
from Figure 2, the scope for such reductions was limited because, in most districts, 
short-time working set in rapidly.  There was, however, some limited procyclical effect 
on timeworkers’ hourly real earnings as shown in Table 7.  In the few districts were 
overtime survived, hourly earnings were further reduced by the cut in the overtime 
premium in 1931.   
Under these circumstances, cutting weekly hours of timeworkers offered the 
only major labour cost response available to employers. From an early stage during the 
economic downturn, engineering companies went on to short-time working schedules in 
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most districts, though especially in the north. This served to reduce payroll costs, lower 
output in line with falling demand, and may have helped to increase marginal product 
given decreasing returns.  Of course, there would have been significant offsetting cost 
increases related to plant underutilization. On the supply side, reductions in hours and 
associated falls in take home pay were unlikely to be strongly resisted by workers and 
their unions. Prospects of alternative employment were virtually zero, especially in the 
exceptionally high unemployment districts of the north. Skilled blue-collar workers, who 
had typically served 5-year apprenticeships, faced the prospect of serious depreciation 
in their human capital given poor expectations of re-employment in the short term.  
And, despite increases in unemployment benefits in the interwar period, social security 
provision for households suffering the loss of their main wage earner was far less 
developed than in the contemporary economy.   
Interestingly, the lack of timeworkers’ hourly real earnings responses applied to 
both northern and southern/midland engineering districts.  Differences in industrial 
composition played no major role, therefore.  This is consistent with a dominant 
influence of time-rate setting between the EEF and national unions.  From Table 6 we 
find that, in respect of district unemployment rates, weekly hours changes – and 
therefore weekly earnings changes - were more significantly procyclical in the north 
compared to the south/midlands.  This almost certainly did reflect an industrial 
compositional effect.    
Turning to pieceworkers, the first expression on the right hand side of equation 
(7) contains all the elements of timeworkers’ hourly earnings with the addition of the 
 24 
pieceworkers’ percentage markup.  The main component of the markup, the nationally 
agreed piecework percentage was reduced in 1931 from one-third to one-quarter of an 
equivalent timeworker’s basic wage rate. The associated downward adjustment of piece 
rates clearly constituted a procyclical effect on pieceworkers’ earnings.  This is only a 
partial story, however. As we note in Section 5, reductions in pieceworkers hourly 
earnings relative to those of timeworkers commenced two years before 1931.  
This leaves the last two pieceworker expressions in equation (7).  One of these, 
changes in the length of total weekly hours, played a role similar to that of timeworkers 
and we know from Table 6 that weekly hours were procyclical for pieceworkers, though 
more strongly so in northern districts.  The other is 
     
   
(      ) which represents the 
hourly earnings effect of the business cycle of changes in hourly productive work 
intensity.  Piecework pay depends not only on piece prices per unit of output but also on 
the number of units of output produced per time period.  To the extent that productive 
workflow reduced through a short-fall in demand, the associated drop in work intensity 
would have negatively impacted on both hourly and weekly money earnings of 
pieceworkers.  Moreover, this effect was potentially large because it acted on all parts 
of the elements that comprise hourly pay, as itemised in equation (6). 
Our data do not allow us to observe changes in hourly productivity on 
pieceworkers’ hourly real earnings cyclicality.  However, a strong indirect piece of 
evidence relates to industrial composition.  Pieceworking predominated in 
southern/midland districts because it was a payments system most suited to this 
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region’s modern engineering activity.  These included the parts production of cars, 
cycles, aircraft, and sundry electrical goods.  In Section 3, we report on evidence that 
changes in hourly productivity in direct reponse to business conditions were a strong 
feature of car production in the EEF.  South/midlands pieceworkers’ hourly real earnings 
were strongly procyclical and significantly more so than those of their northern 
counterparts who worked in more traditional engineering sections.   
During the early years of the Depression cycle, the downward stickiness of hourly 
time-rated wages and the relatively greater flexibility of productivity-based piece rates 
resulted in a fall in the price of piecework relative to equivalent timework (see Figures 4 
and 5).  This would have encouraged employers, where feasible, to substitute into 
piecework.  The percentages of pieceworkers to total workers shown in Figure 1 are in 
line with this expectation.  
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Figure 1 Percentages of pieceworkers to total workers, 1927 – 1937 (EEF data) 
 
            
           Figure 2 Weekly hours of timeworkers and pieceworkers, 1927 – 1937 (EEF Data) 
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                         Figure 3 Unemployment rates in EEF districts, 1927 – 1937 
 
 
 Figure 4 Piecework-timework differentials in hourly earnings, 1927-1937          
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Figure 5 Percentage by which piece-rate hourly wages exceed time-rate hourly wages (turners) 
 
   Notes: Average hourly earnings adjusted for overtime premia. 
           
          Table 1 EEF blue-collar occupations, and district classification 
Occupations 
 
Coppersmiths; Fitters; Fitters (other than skilled); Fitters (skilled); 
Toolroom Fitters; Machinemen (rated at or above fitter's rate); 
Machinemen (rated below a fitter's rate); Moulders; Moulders (loose 
pattern); Patternmakers;  Platers/Riveters/Caulkers; Sheet Metal 
Workers; Turners; Labourers. 
Northern 
districts* 
Aberdeen; Blackburn; Bolton; Burnley; Dundee; Halifax; Hull; Liverpool; 
Manchester; North East Coast; Northern Ireland; North West Scotland, 
Oldham; Preston, Rochdale; Sheffield; Wigan.    
Southern/Midland 
districts* 
Bedford; Burton, Coventry; Derby; Leicester; Lincoln; London; North 
Staffs, Nottingham; West of England; West Midlands.    
Note:  * All EEF districts for which we have matching unemployment rates.  Most of the 
district unemployment rates are obtained from Hart and MacKay (1975).  They coincide with 
EEF districts by combining data on male unemployment and total insured workers taken from 
the Local Unemployment Index.  A few district series are obtained from issues of the Ministry 
of Labour Gazette. 
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Table 2 Recovery from the Depression - timeworkers’ pay and hours 1930/33 to 1934/37: selected EEF districts and sections 
 Average real standard wages 
(coefficients of variation) in 
pence per hour 
 
Percentage 
changes 
Average weekly hours Percentage 
changes 
1930-1933 1934-1937 1930-1933 1934-1937 
DISTRICTS 
 
     
 
Coventry 3.61 (0.28) 4.03 (0.24) 11.63 
 
49.79 (0.02) 51.26 (0.04) 2.95 
 
North East Coast 3.52 (0.14) 3.77 (0.14) 7.10 
 
46.79 (0.04) 50.86 (0.04) 8.70 
 
Halifax 3.45 (0.13) 3.61 (0.13) 4.64 
 
44.19 (0.05) 51.27 (0.06) 16.02 
 
ENGINEERING SECTIONS 
 
  
 
  
 
Motors, cars, cycles 3.40 (0.20) 3.95 (0.23) 16.18 
 
51.73 (0.08) 51.70 (0.03) -0.06 
 
Marine Engineering 3.55 (0.15) 3.89 (0.14) 9.58 46.19 (0.04) 49.08 (0.02) 6.26 
 
Textile machine 
manufacture 
3.29 (0.17) 3.61 (0.15) 9.73 39.86 (0.09) 45.24 (0.03) 13.50 
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Table 3   Percentage of pieceworkers within total workforce by section: EEF, 1927-1937 
Section % Section % 
 
Motors (commercial) 84.0 Instrument makers 50.4 
Motors (cars, cycles etc.) 71.0 Scale, beam etc. 50.0 
Aircraft manufacture 70.5 Marine engineering 49.9 
Locomotive manufacture 66.0 Tank and gasholder makers 42.6 
Vehicle builders 65.9 Construction engineering 41.3 
General engineering (heavy) 62.9 Sheet metal working 40.6 
Gas meter makers 62.7 Founders 39.4 
Electrical engineering 59.6 Miscellaneous 35.8 
Agricultural engineering 59.5 Allied trades 35.5 
Machine tool makers 59.4 Coppersmiths 35.3 
Telephone manufacture 53.2 Lift manufacture 32.3 
Textile machinery makers 52.0 Brassfounders 29.9 
Boiler makers 51.4 Drop forgers 21.1 
General engineering (light) 50.8 Lamp manufacture 9.1 
All sections:  57.4 
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Table 4 Weekly hours and overtime shares by Northern and Southern/Midland EEF districts: 1929 and 1932 
 TIMEWORKERS PIECEWORKERS 
 1929 1932 % Change 1929 1932 % Change 
WEEKLY HOURS       
Northern Districts  48.1 43.7 -9.1 46.3 43.0 -7.1 
Southern/Midland Districts 51.0 47.7 -6.5 48.0 45.6 -5.0 
SHARE OF OVERTIME (%)       
Northern Districts  3.9 0.3 - 2.4 0.1 - 
Southern/Midland Districts 8.1 3.3 - 3.6 0.5 - 
Note: for districts in the north and in south/midlands, see Table 1. 
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Table 5 Weekly real earnings semi-elasticities, 1927-1937 (SUR estimates) 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT TIMEWORKERS 
 
PIECEWORKERS 
National EEF unemployment 
rate 
    
 
      
 
    
 
      
 
 
 
 
-0.811** 
(0.260) 
- 
 
-0.957** 
(0.245) 
- 
 
 
 
-0.742** 
(0.278) 
-0.081 
(0.160) 
-0.889** 
(0.217) 
-0.099 
(0.212) 
District EEF unemployment 
rates 
     
 
       
 
     
 
       
 
 
 
 
-0.643** 
(0.153) 
 
- -1.001** 
(0.272) 
- 
 
 
 
-0.457 
(0.255) 
-0.172 
(0.166) 
-0.782* 
(0.348) 
-0.229 
(0.215) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets with ** (*) indicating 0.01(0.05) significance on two-tail test.  Using national unemployment, earnings 
are deflated by a final output price deflator taken from Feinstein (1972).  Using district unemployment, price deflation obtained through cross-
section and time-series dummy variables.  See Table 2 for the make-up of the two district groups.  Regressions include controls for occupation, 
year, and district fixed effects. Using all districts there are 2906 timeworker observations and 2410 pieceworker observations.  For northern 
districts there are 1963 timeworker and 1357 pieceworker obervations and the respective numbers of observations in southern/midland regions 
are 943 and 1053.  
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Table 6 Weekly hours semi-elasticities, 1927-1937 (SUR estimates) 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT TIMEWORKERS 
 
PIECEWORKERS 
National EEF unemployment 
rate 
    
 
      
 
    
 
      
 
 
 
 
-0.667** 
(0.161) 
- -0.655** 
(0.228) 
- 
 
 
 
-0.646** 
(0.150) 
 
-0.025 
(0.112) 
-0.490* 
(0.213) 
-0.242 
(0.177) 
District EEF unemployment 
rates 
     
 
       
 
     
 
       
 
 
 
 
-0.555** 
(0.162) 
- -0.657** 
(0.241) 
- 
 
 
 
-0.367 
(0.260) 
-0.174 
(0.154) 
-0.241 
(0.300) 
-0.424* 
(0.190) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets with ** (*) indicating 0.01(0.05) significance on two-tail test.  See Table 2 for the make-up of the two 
district groups. Regressions include controls for occupation, year, and district fixed effects.  Numbers of observations are as in Table 5. 
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Table 7 Hourly real wage semi-elasticities, 1927-1937 (SUR estimates) 
 
 STANDARD HOURLY WAGES HOURLY WAGE EARNINGS 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT TIMEWORKERS 
 
TIMEWORKERS 
 
PIECEWORKERS 
National EEF 
unemployment rate 
    
 
      
 
    
 
      
 
    
 
      
 
 
 
 
0.030 
(0.090) 
- -0.144 
(0.119) 
- -0.301** 
(0.047) 
- 
 
 
 
0.131 
(0.122) 
-0.119 
(0.070) 
-0.096 
(0.155) 
-0.056 
(0.085) 
-0.399** 
(0.120) 
0.143 
(0.118) 
District EEF 
unemployment rates 
    
 
      
 
     
 
       
 
     
 
       
 
 
 
 
-0.018 
(0.041) 
- -0.089** 
(0.033) 
- -0.344** 
(0.065) 
- 
 
 
 
-0.039 
(0.077) 
0.019 
(0.063) 
-0.090 
(0.060) 
 
0.001 
(0.054) 
-0.531** 
(0.116) 
0.195* 
(0.085) 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets with ** (*) indicating 0.01(0.05) significance on two-tail test.  Using national unemployment, earnings 
are deflated by a final output price deflator taken from Feinstein (1972).  Using district unemployment, price deflation obtained through cross-
section and time-series dummy variables.  See Table 2 for the make-up of the two district groups.  Numbers of observations are as in Table 5. 
 
